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ZONING AND THE LAW OF NUISANCE
INTRODUCTION
The law of zoning, in a relatively short period of time, has achieved a promi-
nent position. The process by which this facet of land use control originated,
expanded and is maturing, can be traced, to a large extent, by an examination
of its relationship with the much older common law concept of nuisance. Though
the influence of nuisance law on zoning today is limited, zoning has had a con-
tinuing effect on the application of the former. This comment will explore the
various interrelationships of both concepts.
CoMPRIsoN OF NUISANCE AND ZONING
Nuisance Defined
Nuisance is of common-law origin' and is grounded in the maxim that "a
man shall not use his property so as to harm another.' - The concept of nuisance
is a broad one, difficult to define precisely 3 Its meaning has been the subject
of numerous and varied definitions,4 some of which extend its scope beyond
the invasion of property interests. In its narrower, more accurate sense, nuisance
denotes a condition, which because of some noxious or harmful characteristic,
causes an unwarranted interference with the ownership and enjoyment of an-
other's property.
Nuisances have been classified according to the scope of their effects as public
or common, private, and mixed or united. A public nuisance is one which in-
fringes upon those rights shared as a whole by the citizens of the community,
regardless of the number directly injured.3 Private nuisances, on the other
hand, affect one or more persons in the enjoyment of an individual right not
similarly shared by the general public.0 Those which are mixed or united
constitute both a public and a private nuisance.7 A facility, for example, pollut-
ing the atmosphere with smoke or dust may constitute both a public nuisance,
enjoinable at the behest of the municipality, and a private nuisance, actionable
1. See Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 316 (1610).
2. "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." Joyce, The Law of NuLances 45 (105).
3. It has been said that "the only approximately accurate method of dctermining the
meaning of the term nuisance is to examine the cases adjudicating what are and what are
not nuisances." Id. at 1. For a discussion of the relationship between nuLance and ncgli-
gence, see Comment, 24 Ind. L.J. 402 (1949).
4. See, e.g., Hart v. Wagner, 1S4 Ald. 40, 43, 40 A.2d 47, 50 (1944) ; Randall v. Vidlage of
Excelsior, - Alinn. -- , 103 N.V.2d 131, 134 (1960); Lore v. Town of DougLs, - Wyo.
-, 355 P.2d 367, 370 (1960). See also the definitions listcd in Joyce, The Law of
Nuisances 2-5 n.6 (1906). Blackstone gives a broad definition, dczcribing it as "JAlnything
that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage." 3 Blacdstone, Commentaries *216.
5. See, e.g., Echave v. City of Grand junction, 113 Colo. 165, 163, 193 P2d 277, 2,0
(194S); Mandell v. Pivnick, 20 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175 (Super. Ct. 1956).
6. E.g., W. G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953); Adams v. Commir-
sioners, 204 Ald. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954).
7. Garfield Box Co. v. Clifton Paper Bd. Co., 125 N.J.L. 603, 17 A.2d 5-3 (Sup. CL 1941).
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by an individual property owner injured thereby.8 Generally, a public nuisance
cannot be the subject of an action by an individual citizen unless he can show
special injury apart from that suffered by the publicY
Nuisances have been further categorized according to type. A nuisance per se
or at law is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance regardless of
location or surroundings. 10 Examples fitting within this definition are necessar-
ily limited, gambling establishments 1 and disorderly houses12 being the two most
often cited. Much more common are nuisances per accidens, or in fact, those
which become such by reason of circumstances or location.' 8 A gasoline sta-
tion1 4 or funeral parlor 15 may in one location be an authorized activity, and in
another may constitute a nuisance in fact. It has also been held, inaccurately,
that these may be nuisances per se.16 In addition, those activities which have
been declared nuisances by the legislature, or are carried on in violation of an
ordinance, are said to be statutory nuisances.' 7
Zoning Distinguished
In its accurate sense, common-law nuisance applies only to what is in some
way actually or at least potentially noxious or harmful. Zoning is concerned
with the regulation of uses whether or not they fall within this category. The
basic philosophy behind both nuisance and zoning is the same, i.e., the proper
regulation and use of property. But zoning is more comprehensive because it
proceeds on the basis of benefitting the entire community through a more
or less extensive planned scheme of restrictions. Various factors are taken into
consideration such as the character of the district and its suitability for par-
8. See McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 206 La. 121, 122, 19 So. 2d 21, 22 (1944). See also
City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115, 119, 75 P.2d 30, 34 (1938).
9. Schroder v. City of Lincoln, 155 Neb. 599, 52 N.W.2d 808 (1952); Morris v. Borough
of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 174, 93 A.2d 781, 784 (Super. Ct. 1952). See Note, 23
Albany L. Rev. 447 (1959).
10. See Dill v. Exel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539 (1958); Bluemer v. Saginaw
Cent. Oil & Gas Serv., 356 Mich. 399, 97 N.W.2d 90, (1959).
11. Heyne v. Loges, 68 Ariz. 310, 312, 205 P.2d 586, 588 (1949).
12. Kelley v. Clark County, 61 Nev. 293, 296, 127 P.2d 221, 224 (1942); Windfall Mfg.
Co. v. Patterson, 148 Ind. 414, 416, 47 N.E. 2, 4 (1897).
13. E.g., Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 269 Ala. 79, 83, 110 So. 2d 911,
915-16 (1959).
A nuisance per se is sometimes referred to as an absolute nuisance, and a nuisance In fact
as a qualified nuisance. Interstate Sash & Door Co. v. City of Cleveland, 148 Ohio St. 325,
326, 74 N.E.2d 239, 240-41 (1947). "[Tlhe former ... is established by proof of the mere
act ... the latter by proof of the act and its consequences." State v. WOR-TV Tower, 39
N.J. Super. 583, 587, 121 A.2d 764, 768 (Super. Ct. 1956).
14. Bell v. Brockman, 190 Okla. 583, 584, 126 P.2d 78, 79 (1942); Thomas v. Dougherty,
325 Pa. 525, 526, 190 Atl. 886, 887 (1937).
15. City of St. Paul v. Kessler, 146 Minn. 124, 125, 178 N.W. 171, 172 (1920).
16. Pennell v. Kennedy, 338 Pa. 285, 12 A.2d 54 (1940) ; Appeal of Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156
AUt. 305 (1931). See Note, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 269 (1959).
17. O'Keefe v. Sheehan, 235 Mass. 390, 126 N.E. 822 (1920).
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ticular uses,' s the conservation of property values,10 the lessening of traffic con-
gestion,2 0 public safety,2 ' and aesthetic considerations. 22 These and similar
factors may also be given weight in nuisance actions.2 3 In the latter case, they
are not prior, planned considerations, as they are in zoning, but rather constitute
evidentiary aids in determining the character of the use in question.
INTFLUENCE OF NUISANCE ON THE DEvELOP=IENT OF ZONING
Nuisance law exerted a greater influence on zoning when it was in its forma-
tive stages than it does today. It was early recognized that the validity of zon-
ing laws was based not upon their relation to the law of nuisance, but upon the
police power of the state.24 Yet courts relied on the concept of nuisance in pass-
ing upon the new zoning ordinancesY2 Since the first zoning enactments were
little more than nuisance regulations,20 it was natural for courts to tend to relate
them by analogy. Particularly before the decision in Village of Euclid v. A;,-
bler Realty Co.,27 which upheld zoning regulations as a proper exercise of the
police power, restrictions of uses which were also common-law nuisances, or
which at least contained elements of the same, were more likely to be upheld.2
Failure to give compensation for the restriction of uses which were not nuisances
was considered to border on deprivation of property without due process of law.
As zoning ordinances expanded to include the regulation of nonoffensive sub-
18. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 303 (1926); City of Kcene V.
Blood, 101 N.H. 466, 146 A.2d 262 (1953); Eves v. Zoning Bd., 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7
(1960). Additional zoning purpose are listed in State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 94-97 n.1,
147 Atl. 294, 295-96 n.1 (1929). See also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 5226 (1953).
19. Strain v. Mims, 123 Conn. 275, 193 At!. 754 (1937); Cobble Close Farm v. Board of
Adjustment, 10 N.J. 442,452-53, 92 A.2d 4, 9 (1952).
20. Northwest Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A2d 743, 7-3
(194S).
21. State v. Iten, - Minn. -, -, 105 N.W.2d 366, 36S-69 (19160).
22. See Comment, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 729 (1961).
23. Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 361 Mlich. 399, 105 N.W.2d 143 (19G0); Sohns v.
Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 105 N.W%.2d 813 (1960); Pennoyer v. Mlen, 56 Wis. 502, 14 N.W. (669
(133). See also Beuscher & Morrison, judicial Zoning Through Rccent Nusance Ca=z,
1955 Wis. L. Rev. 440,443.
24. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 36, 337-SS (1926); Miller v.
Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 534, 234 Pac. 3M1, 384 (1925); Boyd v. City of Sierra
Madre, 41 Cal. App. 520, 183 Pac. 230 (Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Comment, 32 Yale LJ. 333,
334 (1923); Comment, 29 Yale L.J. 109 (1919).
25. See Noel, Unaesthetic Sights As Nuisances, 25 Cornell L.Q. 1, 14 (1939).
26. See Bettman, The Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 034, 039 (1924):
"[Z]oning represents no radically new type of property regulation, but merely an cxtenion
or new application of sanctioned traditional methods for sanctioned traditional purpo:es!'
See also Comment, 39 Yale LJ. 735, 737-38 (1930).
27. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2S. "When zoning was new and had to win its way through legislaturcs and the courts,
theories not linking up with familiar categories of power and policy would have been no
help to the cause, the legal pioneers in the movement were wise to proceed a- they did."
Freund, Some Problems in the Law of Zoning, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 135, 149 (1929).
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jects, it became clear that the police power of the state was the sole basis for
their constitutionality. This was conclusively determined by the Euclid deci-
sion, although it was noted by Mr. Justice Sutherland that the analogies of
nuisance law, where applicable, could serve as useful guides. 29 It could no
longer be doubted that zoning was not limited to or coextensive with nuisance.
However, because of the early reliance on nuisance, and because of the analogy
between nuisances and restricted uses, courts remained prone to regard all re-
stricted uses as nuisances, if not in theory, at least in terminology. Use of
nuisance terms in zoning cases has persisted long after the cleavage between them
should have become complete.30 This has helped to sustain the notion, less and
less prevalent, that somehow nuisance and zoning are dependent upon each other.
Nuisance influence has remained strongest in the field of retroactive zoning.31
Logically, it was felt that a more persuasive reason was necessary to justify the
removal without compensation of already existing uses than the prohibition of
future ones. The abatement power over nuisance could be borrowed if there
were in fact an element of common-law nuisance present in the subject sought
to be removed. 32 Reliance upon the latter was felt to be necessary because of
the difference in the application of the respective powers of zoning and nuisance.
This was explained by the court in Jones v. City of Los Angeles:3"
And here the distinction between the power to prohibit nuisances and the power to zone
is exceedingly important. The power over nuisances is more circumscribed in its objects;
but once an undoubted menace to public health, safety, or morals is shown, the method
of protection may be drastic .... Zoning is not so limited in its purposes .... It deals
with many uses of property which are in no way harmful. If its objects are so much
broader than those of nuisance regulation, if its invasion of private property interests is
more extensive, and if the public necessity to justify its exercise need not be so pressing,
then does it not follow that its means of regulation must be more reasonable and less
destructive of established interests?3 4
Generally, nonconforming uses which were not actual nuisances would be
protected even today from removal without compensation. 35 Yet if they become
29. 272 U.s. at 387-88.
30. See Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); King v. Blue
Mountain Forest Ass'n, 100 N.H. 212, 123 A.2d 151 (1956); Mayor of Alpine v. Brewster, 7
N.J. 42, 80 A.2d 297 (1951) ; Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26,
100 A.2d 182, 189 (Super. Ct.), aff'd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
31. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14, 22 (1930) ; Noel, Retro-
active Zoning and Nuisances, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 473 (1941); O'Reilly, The Non-
Conforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 Geo. L.J. 218, 225 (1934).
32. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 31; Noel, supra note 31, at 473: "Although
according to the better view it is not essential that a particular enterprise actually constitute
a common-law nuisance to be subject to legislative removal, the matter of whether injunc-
tions have been frequent or rare will influence strongly the decision as to whether the use is
sufficiently detrimental to the public welfare to be subject to removal without compensation."
33. 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
34. Id. at 310, 295 Pac. at 20. See also Comment, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 685, 692.
35. Kryscnski v. Shenkin, 53 N.J. Super. 590, 148 A.2d 58 (Super. Ct. 1959); People v.
Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952) ; Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene
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inimical to the public health or safety, they may be removed under the police
power.30 Even though such uses are usually found to be nuisances, this finding
is unnecessary. Zoning has thus achieved an independent, self-sufficient status.
This contrasts sharply with the earlier consideration of zoning as a mere exten-
sion of nuisance law.
INFLUENCE OF ZoN.i'rG ON THE LAW Or NUIS.%ANCE
The growth of zoning may be tending to liberalize nuisance law. This is
indicated by an analysis of court decisions in nuisance cases outside of zoned
areas.3 7 Since the trend today is toward a liberal application of zoning laws,
the effect upon nuisance law in zoned areas has been similar. In the latter in-
stance, however, the influence has been more direct, leading some courts to hold
that where they coincide with common-law nuisance, zoning regulations have
pre-empted the field.38 At the least, while the law of nuisance remains es-
sentially distinct, zoning statutes have to varying degrees circumscribed the
extent of nuisance actions. There are dual aspects of this effect-the authoriza-
tion of common-law nuisances and the restriction of uses which are not such.
Effect of Authorizing Ordinances
A use which is being properly operated in an authorized zone cannot be a
nuisance per se. Generally it cannot be a public nuisance eitherF2 In reaching
this conclusion, the court, in Robinson Brick Co. v. Lntki,40 stated:
Where the legislative arm of the government has declared by statute and zoning rezolu-
tion what activities may or may not be conducted in a prescribed zone, it has in effect
declared what is or is not a public nuisance.4 '
An authorized use, however, may constitute what is in fact a public nuisance0 2
Realty Corp., 24 'Misc. 2d 790, 200 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Incorporated Village of
No. Hornell v. Rauber, 181 lisc. 546, 40 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See generally
Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1941); O'Reilly, The Non-
Conforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 Geo. L.J. 213 (1934).
36. Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp., supra note 35. "How
far the police power will go in sustaining a governmental agency in interfering with ctab-
lished property rights without paying compensation therefore is not capable of -act state-
ment. Apparently it is a matter of weighing the urgency of the evil to be corrected agast
the cost to the property owner of complying with the new law, or the dimunition in value
which results from it... ." Id. at 798, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
37. Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L.
Rev. 440.
33. Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946); Godard v. Babzon-
Dow lfg. Co., 313 Mass. 2S0, 47 N.E.2d 303 (1943). See generally Kurtz, The Effect of
Land Use Legislation on the Common Law of Nuisance in Urban Areas, 36 Dicta 414 (1959);
Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1955).
39. E.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 269, 202 P.2d 507, 511
(1955); Nugent v. Vallone, - R.I. -, 161 A.2d S02 (1960); Lindermeyer v. City of Mil-
waukee, 241 Wis. 637, 639, 6 N.W.2d 653, 655 (1942).
40. 115 Colo. 105, 169 P.2d 171 (1946).
41. Id. at 108, 169 P.2d at 173.
42. See the definition of public nuisance at text accompanying note 5 supra.
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But since the governing authority which has authorized the use is also the only
proper party to bring an action for abatement of a public nuisance, 43 the remedy
has, in effect, been suspended.
The court, in Robinson, went further, and held that even if the mining opera-
tions in question were a private nuisance, the lower court had no jurisdiction to
enjoin the operation, because of the authorizing statute.44 A majority of courts,
however, have held that a use, which, though authorized by statute, becomes a
nuisance in fact, may be the basis of an action to enjoin a private nuisance on the
part of the one injured.45 This view recognizes that what constitutes a nuisance
should not be conclusively determined by zoning ordinances. The minority cases
hold that the zoning ordinance, since it decides which uses are permitted in
various zones, is decisive as to whether nuisance remedies should be granted.
The implication, therefore, is that a remedy for a private nuisance will not be
permitted against an authorized use, not because it is not in fact a common-law
nuisance, but because it is located in an authorized zone.40 At least one state
has expressly so provided by statute.47
The theory behind this enactment and decisions of similar effect is that per-
sons living in developed areas must to a certain degree submit to the unavoidable
annoyances and discomfort attendant upon the operation of necessary industries
or facilities. It is the purpose of zoning to attempt to strike a balance between
these conflicting interests as painlessly as possible. Necessarily the line must be
drawn somewhere, resulting in different classifications of zones. For this reason,
"what would be an unreasonable interference with the comfortable enjoyment
of one's home in a residential area might be regarded as the normal, expected
and inescapable concomitant of modern social conditions in an industrial
section." 48
Thus the conflict in this line of cases is not whether a nuisance is in fact
present, but over the policy question of whether authorized operations will be
actionable despite their careful conduct. To say that an authorized use is not
or cannot be a nuisance really means that the complainant is without a remedy.
43. See Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 AtI. 379 (1917); Morris v.
Borough of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 93 A.2d 781 (Super. Ct. 1952).
44. 115 Colo. at 108, 169 P.2d at 173.
45. E.g., Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 170 F. Supp. 396 (D.R.I 1959); Vulcan
Materials Co. v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811, 815, 114 S.E.2d 29, 33-34 (1960); Rockenbach v.
Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 341, 47 N.W.2d 636, 639 (1951) ; Sweet v. Campbell, 282 N.Y. 146,
25 N.E.2d 963 (1940) (four-to-three decision); Reid v. Brodsky, 397 Pa. 463, 465 n.1, 156
A.2d 334, 336 n.1 (1959). See 9 Fordham L. Rev. 437 (1940); 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 323
(1960).
46. See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 142 Misc. 329, 254 N.Y. Supp. 403 (Sup. Ct.
1931). See also Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases,
1955 Wis. L. Rev. 440, 443-44; Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 266, 267 (1955).
47. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 731a. Compare Fendley v. City of Anaheim, 110 Cal. 731,
294 Pac. 769 (1930), with Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d
507 (1955).
48. Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211, 218 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955). See also Kankakee v. New York C.R.R., 387 Ill. 109, 55 N.E.2d 87, 90 (1944).
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The expression that the legislature may legalize that which otherwise would be a
public or private nuisanceO9 leads to the same result. Conversely, the legislature
has the power to prescribe, under reasonable limitations, that certain operations
constitute nuisances, thereby changing the common-law classifications.Pc
The Effect of Zoning Ordinances Upon Unauthorized Uses
The authority of the legislature to modify the extent of nuisance law has been
carried to an extreme by several casesP1 which have declared that any operation
carried out in violation of a zoning ordinance is a nuisance, even, in some in-
stances, a nuisance per se. Thus a retail store in a residential area has been ex-
pressly declared a nuisance because it violated a zoning ordinance, 2 although the
restriction has no real relation to the common-law concept of nuisance.- The
effect of these decisions is to extend the definition of nuisance beyond its tradi-
tional meaning, thereby introducing another element of uncertainty into this
already ill-defined and confused area.
The majority of courts recognize that the legislature does not have the power
to declare that a violation of a zoning ordinance will itself constitute a nuisnce.64
Structures erected subsequent to and in violation of a zoning ordinance may of
course be enjoined,5 whether they are or are not common-law nuisances. On
the other hand, prior nonconforming uses which cannot be reasonably included
either under the police power, or under nuisance law, should not be subject to
removal without compensation.c0
Ultimately, the test, in the case of either future or existing nonconforming
uses, reduces itself basically to the question of whether the restrictive ordinance,
considering all the circumstances, is or is not arbitrary in its application.c7 The
fact that a restricted operation is denominated a nuisance, a statutory nuisance,
or is excludable under the police power is not determinative. This goes back to
49. Godard v. Babson-Dow Mlfg. Co., 313 Mass. 2S0, 47 N.E.2d 303 (1943); Clutter v.
Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940).
50. Mayor of Alpine v. Brewster, 7 N.J. 42, 80 A.2d 297 (1951); Borough of Cre-kill v.
Borough of Dumont, 23 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (Super. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 15 NJ. 23S,
104 A-2d 441 (1954). See alho Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 3190 (1953).
51. See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 753 (Dct. Ct. App.
1946); City of New Orleans v. Lafon, 61 So. 2d 270, 273 (La. Ct. App. 1952); Hdni v.
Pecher, 330 Pa. 232, 234, 193 AUt. 797, 799 (1933). See also People v. Kelly, 295 Micb. 632,
634, 295 N.W. 341, 343 (1940).
52. City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, Ltd., 157 La. 26, 101 So. 793 (1924).
53. Ibid.
54. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930) ; Mlonzolino v. Gro,-
man, 11 NJ.L. 325, 16S AUt. 673 (1933); Parker v. Zoning Bd., - RI. -, -, 156 A.2d 210,
213 (1959); Greenwood v. The Olympic, Inc, 51 Wash. 2d IS, 315 P.2d 295 (1957).
55. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 3232 (1953).
56. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
57. Reese v. Mandel, 224 Md. 121, 125, 167 A.2d 111, 115-16 (1961); Kozcnkk v. Town-
ship of Montgomery, 24 NJ. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); D-lav.anna Iron & Metal Co. v.
Albrecht, 9 N.J. 424, 426, 3S A.2d 616, 613 (1952) ; Walker v. Town of E"in, 254 N.C. 33,
83, 113 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1961); Gayland v. Salt Lake County, - Utah 3, 5, 33 P.2d 633, 636
(1961).
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the distinction between nuisance and zoning noted in the early case of City of
Aurora v. Burns, 58 a view subsequently adopted by the Euclid decision:
The exclusion of places of business from residential districts is not a declaration that
such places are nuisances or that they are to be suppressed as such, but it is a part of
the general plan by which the city's territory is allotted to different uses in order to pre-
vent, or at least to reduce, the congestion, disorder, and dangers which often inhere in un-
regulated municipal development.59
If the operation in question is not offensive or dangerous, it should not prop-
erly be the subject of a nuisance action. If it is a proposed use, it may be
restricted by a zoning ordinance. But if it preceded the zoning regulation it will
generally be protected as a nonconforming use. 0 The courts, in applying a rule
of reason, to both zoning and nuisance restrictions, will determine whether they
are so confiscatory as to come within the purview of the just compensation clause
of the fifth amendment or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
This is actually the underlying basis for the validity of all regulatory enact-
ments dealing with property.
Zoning Laws as Evidence of Nuisance
In nuisance actions, courts may take into consideration zoning regulations
proscribing or authorizing similar uses. While the presence or absence of such
statutes may be persuasive evidence, it is not determinative of the question in
the particular case.61 The majority of courts do not feel conclusively bound in
nuisance cases by zoning ordinances either authorizing or prohibiting the type
of operation in question.
0 2
CONCLUSION
Both nuisance and zoning derive from the same basis-the police power; and
both have the same ultimate purpose-land use regulation. Both are ultimately
governed in their application by the appropriate clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Within these bounds, the unmistakable tendency has been
to allow a widening of the scope of zoning and an extension of its powers to the
outside limits of what is a reasonable and non arbitrary plan for a better com-
munity. Similarly, except where the policy of protection of industrial uses has
intervened, there has been a liberalization of the application of nuisance law.
It can be expected that in the future there will be a decrease in the uncer-
tainty caused by relating zoning with the confusing concept of nuisance, propor-
tionate to the increase in the scope and self-sufficiency of zoning.
58. 319 Ill. 93, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
59. 272 U.S. at 392-93 (1926), citing City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 93, 94-95, 149
N.E. 784, 788 (1925).
60. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. See also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 5233
(1953).
61. See Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 170 F. Supp. 396, 409 (D.R.I. 1959);
Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 269 Ala. 79, 110 So. 2d 911 (1959) ; Rocken-
bach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 341, 47 N.W.2d 636, 639 (1951); White v. Old York Rd.
Country Club, 222 Pa. 147, 185 Atl. 316 (1936) ; Appeal of Perin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 Ad. 305
(1931). See also Kellerhals v. Kalenberger, - Iowa -, 103 N.W.2d 691 (1960); Sohns v.
Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960).
62. See notes 45 and 54 supra and accompanying text.
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